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Abstract
Using the 2010 Life in Transition Survey, we show that localities with higher religious
diversity have more respondents who have tried to set up a business. Although
religious diversity also correlates with a higher start-up probability (following trial), this
effect is driven by access to finance and risk preferences. We provide suggestive
evidence that the positive association between religious diversity and entrepreneurial
trial is positively moderated by social capital (when measured as access to weak ties
and the ability to bridge structural holes). Our results suggest that programs which
encourage entrepreneurial attempts in diverse areas and develop such social capital
are likely to be particularly effective. At the start-up stage, relaxing credit constraints
should rank high on the policy agenda.
JEL codes: J15; L26; P23
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Diversity; Transition region
Introduction
The success of the transition economies in the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe has been tightly linked to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial activity is an
important ingredient of growth, particularly in the early years of transition, since small
business owners established businesses in industries that did not exist, or were stagnant,
under socialism (Berkowitz and DeJong 2011). Likewise, sales and employment grow
faster in entrepreneurial ventures than in state or privatized firms, and new businesses
are more efficient (McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Entrepreneurial ventures may also be
an effective way of mitigating income shocks by providing households with an alternative
source of employment. Yet the determinants of entrepreneurship in transition countries
are insufficiently understood. This is not only due to the lack of comparable data on busi-
ness attempts and start-ups across all transition countries, but also because it is difficult
to define an entrepreneur in this context. In the transition region, the most common type
of business owner is not the well studied Schumpeterian type prevalent in the West, but
rather the Kirznerian type that is less innovative and more dependent on his environment
for the generation of opportunities (Estrin et al. 2006).
In this paper, we bridge these gaps by studying the link between local religious diversity
(measured as religious fractionalization in each respondent’s locality, or primary sam-
pling unit) and individual entrepreneurial behavior, using a new data set: the 2010 Life in
Transition Survey (LiTS). This rich data set, which covers 29 transition countries, allows
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us to focus on individuals who have taken steps towards founding a business but who
have not yet become business owners (the trial stage), as well as on those who have man-
aged to complete the process of founding an enterprise (the start-up stage). In particular,
our data captures small businesses that may operate in either the formal or the informal
sector.
We find that religiously diverse localities have more respondents who tried to start a
business as well as a higher number of start-ups. While the former correlation survives
when we introduce additional individual and local-level controls, the latter disappears
once we control for the respondent’s access to borrowing and risk preferences, highlight-
ing the role of financing constraints for business survival. In addition, our results are less
likely to be driven by the differential impact of diversity on necessity versus opportunity
entrepreneurs, as we control for respondents’ education and family socio-economic char-
acteristics. To understand further what drives the link between religious diversity and
entrepreneurship, we also investigate the moderating role of social capital, which may be
particularly relevant for businesses when formal institutions are weak or insecure, as is
the case in many transition countries. We find that social capital, measured by the extent
to which the respondent meets friends, negatively moderates the association between
local diversity and entrepreneurial trial and startup. In contrast, religious diversity has
a strong positive effect on entrepreneurial trial for those respondents whose social net-
works expand beyond the family, close friends and work colleagues, or who believe that
effort and hard work, or intelligence and skills are the most important factors to succeed
in one’s country.
Our research design has a number of attractive features. Focusing on a group of coun-
tries with similar history, geography and culture helps us to overcome the issue of country
heterogeneity present in broader cross-country studies, such as those using the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data. All of the countries in our sample underwent
almost half a century of Soviet rule, which, in addition to imposing a common set of
political and economic institutions, also banned private enterprise, which re-emerged fol-
lowing the collapse of communism across the region in 1989. Second, the richness of our
data set allows us to account for a wide variety of characteristics that may affect both
religious diversity and entrepreneurship, such as individual and family communist party
membership, family background, or risk preferences. One notable innovation of our paper
is that we are also able to account for fixed national and sub-national characteristics that
may be confounding our results by including country fixed effects, along with primary
sampling unit (PSU) geographic characteristics.Moreover, whilemost of the literature has
calculated national diversity measures which may be correlated with a variety of country-
level characteristics, our data instead allows us to calculate a new, sub-national measure
of religious diversity at the PSU level.1
Our work integrates several strands of the literature. First, our findings are relevant for
the small but growing literature on entrepreneurship in transition countries (Aidis et al.
2008; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011; Djankov et al. 2005, 2006). In addition, we speak to an
extensive literature which links ethnic, language and religious diversity to aggregate-level
outcomes such as economic development, war or the provision of public goods. While
one strand of this work claims that diversity can breed poverty and conflict (Alesina et al.
1999; Easterly and Levine 1997; Reynal-Querol 2002), recent work has instead reached
more nuanced conclusions. For example, Ashraf and Galor 2013 show that historical
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differences in genetic diversity within a society have a hump-shaped effect on produc-
tivity, while Ager and Brückner 2013 find that cultural fractionalization within the US in
the 1870-1920 period actually increased output. Similarly, Alesina et al. 2013 find that
an index of birthplace diversity is positively related to economic development.2 Finally,
our paper relates to a large management literature on the (mostly undecided) impact of
diversity at the firm level, which we review in more detail in the next section.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that programs encouraging entre-
preneurial attempts may be particularly successful in more diverse areas. In addition,
social capital which fosters the formation of non-familial ties and belief in one’s own
abilities, possibly through access to new communication technologies or networking
opportunities with more experienced business owners, is likely to enhance these effects.
However, religious diversity matters less at the startup stage, where the highest impact
could come from facilitating access to finance. As we discuss in the last section of
the paper, formal banking may be less effective at easing credit constraints for infor-
mal entrepreneurs, and less traditional approaches (such as microcredit schemes, for
instance) may have to be adopted. All in all, our results suggest that, under the appropri-
ate circumstances, nurturing Kirznerian entrepreneurs may accelerate the transition to a
market economy which has stalled in many countries in the region. Such small-scale busi-
nesses may not only provide valuable employment and income opportunities, but may
also eventually transform into fully fledged enterprises.
The approach and results of this paper are subject to twomain caveats. First, LiTS is nei-
ther an entrepreneurial survey nor a country census, so one may question the reliability of
our measures of diversity and entrepreneurship. This is less likely to be a serious concern,
as the country-level correlations between our survey variables and those from the Global
EntrepreneurshipMonitor (on the comparable questions on entrepreneurial trial) and the
Alesina et al. 2003 data on religious and language fractionalization are between 0.6 and
0.85. Second, while LiTS is representative at the country level, this is not the case for sub-
national levels of aggregation. Unfortunately, no other sub-national measures of religious
diversity for the entire transition region are available. Analysis at the primary sampling
unit (PSU) level using the LiTS data has also been undertaken in other published work,
such as Grosjean 2011 and Grosjean and Senik 2011. We also replicate our results using
diversity calculated at the level of sub-national administrative regions and obtain similar
results.
Our empirical results provide strong evidence that local religious diversity is pos-
itively correlated with entrepreneurial trial as well as start-up (the latter through its
effect on access to finance and risk attitudes). There do, however, remain other possi-
ble explanations that may account for the patterns observed in the data. In particular,
our identification assumes that local religious fractionalization is not correlated with
omitted characteristics at the individual or locality level. Moreover, it is possible that
entrepreneurship directly affects diversity.
We use three inter-related approaches to address these concerns. First, we control for
a wide variety of individual and PSU-level characteristics, ranging from a respondent’s
religion to PSU-level corruption and trust. We also include country fixed effects and a
battery of PSU-level geographic controls in all regressions. Second, using the approach
developed by Altonji et al. 2005, we calculate that the effect of unobservables needs to be
at least two times higher than the effect of observables to explain away the diversity effect,
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which is unlikely. Third, our results survive when we control for whether the respondent
has ever moved, as well as when we limit our observations to only years after 2005, sug-
gesting that reverse causality between entrepreneurship and diversity is less likely to be
an issue. Admittedly, several of our control variables - such as our measures of social cap-
ital, risk attitudes, or PSU-level non-geographic controls - are less likely to be exogenous,
which suggests that our results should be regarded primarily as correlations. Neverthe-
less, our multi-pronged approach makes it less likely that our results capture simply a
spurious relationship.
Theory and hypotheses
The determinants of entrepreneurship
An individual will become an entrepreneur provided that the perceived benefits of such an
undertaking are higher than the expected costs. Unfortunately, researchers rarely observe
decision making directly, so a “second-best” solution is to proxy such costs and benefits
using various individual and environmental factors. For instance, more risk-loving indi-
viduals may have higher perceived returns to entrepreneurship, while starting a business
in a rural area may be regarded as costly, due to higher transportation costs or lower
market size.
The relative importance of various factors may be different at different stages of
entrepreneurship, which can be regarded as a multi-stage selection process (Eckhardt
and Ciuchta 2008). Entrepreneurs draw from an initial pool of opportunities with varying
characteristics, following which further selection, either internal (by the entrepreneur)
or external (by other market participants), takes place. Local factors that generate
entrepreneurial opportunities may thus be crucial in the initial entrepreneurial stage, and
less important in subsequent stages.
Alternatively, localities with distinct economic, political and cultural characteristics
may not produce the same type of entrepreneur. In the transition region, Estrin et al. 2006
examine the different types of entrepreneurs associated with each stage of the transition
process. In the first stage with extreme uncertainty, no market structure and only infor-
mal networks, there is place only for Kirznerian entrepreneurs. While the spotlight in the
literature has been on the glorious Schumpeterian entrepreneur who brings about “cre-
ative destruction” (Schumpeter 1934), Kirzner 1973 argues that opportunities do not arise
from new information, but from differential access to existing information. A Kirzne-
rian opportunity is more common, less innovative and reinforces established business
practices.
In the second stage, the price mechanism starts slowly functioning as a conveyor of
information. But it is only in the third stage - the development of which has stalled in
many transition countries - that more developed market institutions and property rights
create the necessary environment for the existence of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. Pro-
gression from stage to stage is not automatic and the initial Kirznerian entrepreneurship
can become entrenched.
As a result, these two conflicting views of entrepreneurship lead to very different
expectations of its determinants. A Kirznerian entrepreneur, unlike his Schumpeterian
counter-part, is deeply tied to his environment, due to its generating capacity of opportu-
nities. As a result, characteristics of the entrepreneur’s locality, such as diversity, may be
particularly important.
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In the rest of this section, we discuss in more detail the mechanisms through which
diversity may affect the costs and benefits associated with the decision to become an
entrepreneur. We close by examining how social capital may affect the relationship
between diversity and entrepreneurship.
The role of (religious) diversity
Diversity can affect entrepreneurship through at least two potentially opposing chan-
nels. At the firm or group level, heterogeneity could lead to better decision-making
and positive outcomes. For instance, diverse groups are likely to have access to non-
overlapping information sets and various skills relevant to a particular task (Lazear
1999). Moreover, exposure to different views can lead to creativity and innovation
(Hong and Page 2001). On the other hand, diversity may breed conflicts and poor
outcomes. According to the social characterization view, people categorize them-
selves and others based on similarities and differences, which leads to the distinction
between insiders and outsiders (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). In-group members may
be more trusted, which implies that homogeneous groups have fewer conflicts, are
more committed and can better impose sanctions and enforce contracts (Fearon and
Laitin 1996).3
As discussed in the introduction, diversity can have similar opposing effects in the
cross-country setting as well. Diversity can lead to more conflict, less growth and less
trust, but it can also spur productivity, output and economic development. The inabil-
ity of diverse societies to agree on public good provision documented in the literature
(Alesina et al. 1999) may be overcome with the provision of more but equally efficient
private goods. In addition, diversity may be more likely to have a positive effect for more
advanced societies, as opposed to poor economies.
Separating these effects of diversity is challenging from both a substantive and empir-
ical point of view. Conceptually, diversity may capture language, ethnic and religious
differences, among others. In this paper, we focus on religious diversity for several
reasons. First, defining diversity precisely is important, as not all types of diversity
may affect entrepreneurship in the same way. Second, religious identity is arguably
less imprecise as compared to ethnicity or language: even if a person can be multi-
lingual or multi-ethnic, one can rarely be a member of multiple religious group. As
a result, endogenous reporting of religious affiliation may be less likely, as compared
to ethnicity or language. Moreover, even though communist governments suppressed
religious practise, religious cleavages have been important in the region both histor-
ically (during the times of the Ottoman empire) as well as more recently (during
the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Tajikistan, among others). Even so,
we replicate our analysis below with a language diversity measure and obtain similar
results (Unfortunately, we cannot do the same for ethnicity, as due to the open-ended
nature of the survey question, ethnicity data is missing for a very large number of
observations).
Our expectation is that, in the transition region context, the positive effects of reli-
gious diversity on entrepreneurship are likely to dominate. Despite the salience of
religious divisions, faith-based conflict has been circumscribed to several countries
only, while in most places peaceful co-existence has been the norm. Moreover, strong
income growth in many transition countries may have provided additional incentives
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to harness the benefits, rather than costs, of diversity. Alternatively, it is also possible
that some of diversity’s negative consequences, such as higher likelihood of conflict or
labor discrimination, provide niche markets for business starters. For example, individ-
uals excluded from government employment may be more likely to set up successful
businesses, while post-conflict reconstruction may create demand for entrepreneurs’
services.
Social capital
The individual and environmental determinants of entrepreneurship discussed at the
beginning of this section may not exist in isolation. For instance, social capital has
been found to be a key driver of entrepreneurial behavior, as it allows access to infor-
mation through social networks (Burt 1992). Information is sticky, so contact to the
person holding it may be important (Von Hippel 1994). Social capital may also matter
when market information is ambiguous and not a clear guide to behavior, as networks
can replace information (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). As a result, entrepreneurs
with social capital may be better equipped to take advantage of the positive effects of
diversity.
Social capital can arise from different types of structures. Coleman 1994 argue for
the benefits of closed, dense networks, where everybody is connected to everybody. In
such a network, frequent contact not only leads to exchange of information, but also to
trust as collective sanctions can be easily imposed and reputation can arise. Therefore,
closure increases the risk of cooperation. In contrast, Burt 1992, argues that structural
holes in a network increase the benefits of cooperation, as those who bridge these holes
obtain a competitive advantage, due to the different information which each group car-
ries. The broker between two groups gets early access to new information and achieves
entrepreneurial control over the flow of information.4
In short, the social capital of a group may increase with the network density inside
the group and as well as with weak ties to outside groups. We expect that a community
that is religiously diverse can benefit from both of these advantages. On the one hand,
religious groups are densely connected within. Religion’s function, according to evolution-
ary theorists, is to offer selective advantage at the group level by promoting cooperative
behavior within the group (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). Moreover, each additional reli-
gious group creates additional structural holes in the community that offer potential for
bridging to entrepreneurial individuals with social capital. Therefore, religious diversity
could harness both the benefits of closure around a particular religion and the bridging
advantages among different groups.
This discussion leads us to three hypotheses which we will test in the remainder of the
paper:
H1: The two stages of entrepreneurship, Trial and Startup, are affected differently by
individual and environmental factors.
H2: Religious diversity is positively associated with entrepreneurship (either Trial,
Startup or both).
H3: Religious diversity in a community is particularly beneficial to entrepreneurs with
social capital.
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Data andmethod
Data description
Ourmain data source is the Life in Transition Survey II (LiTS) conducted by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and theWorld Bank in 2010. LiTS is a nation-
ally representative survey which covers 29 post-transition countries.5 Respondents were
drawn randomly, using a two-stage sampling method with primary and secondary sam-
pling units. The Primary Sampling Units (PSU) are electoral districts, polling station
territories, census enumeration districts or geo-administrative divisions. In our analysis, a
locality is equivalent to a PSU. The Secondary Sampling Units are households. Each coun-
try has aminimum of 50 PSUs with each PSU containing around 20 households (for a total
of approximately 1,000 observations), with the exception of Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Serbia and Poland, where 75 PSUs containing around 20 households each were drawn (for
a total of approximately 1,500 observations).
The head of the household or another knowledgeable household member answered the
Household Roster and questions about housing and expenses. All other modules were
answered by a randomly drawn adult (over 18 years of age) from the household with no
substitutions possible.6 The survey company, IPSOS-Mori, provided us with additional
data on PSU population size. We supplemented the survey data with external data on
PSU geographic characteristics and access to natural resources. More information on the
sources and definitions of all variables can be found in the next subsection as well as in
the Additional file 1.
Econometric method
Dependent variables
Our first dependent variable (Trial) is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent positively
answers the question “Have you ever tried to set up a business?” Our second depdendent
variable, Startup, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent positively answers the
question “Did you manage to set it up?” Our definition of entrepreneurship is very much
in line with the approach taken in the rest of the literature, which takes a broad view and
considers those who are business starters and owners, as well as formally and informally
self-employed individuals (Brück et al. 2013). However, note the use of the term “set up.”
Rather than based on objective criteria related to founding a company, such as its profits
or sales, the answer is left to the subjective definition of the respondent. This comes with
the obvious pitfall that each respondent’s understanding of setting up a business may be
different. For example, the respondents’ definitions of business startup may be culturally
determined, which however should be mitigated by including country fixed effects and
clustering the errors at the country level.
Nevertheless, we believe that our measures of entrepreneurship capture more than
simply noise. In the transition context, where legal frameworks in many countries are
in a constant reform process, where contracts are not always enforced by courts and
where market mechanisms can fail to function, it may be difficult to find an objec-
tive definition of entrepreneurship that remains unchanged over the years.7 Moreover,
in such an environment of bureaucratic hurdles and high legislative uncertainty, many
entrepreneurs may prefer to not register a formal business (Estrin et al. 2006). Although
our data cannot distinguish between formal and informal businesses, one advantage of
our entrepreneurship measures is that they are likely to capture both.
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Independent variables
Our main explanatory variable is religious diversity in an individual’s community, with
the latter defined as the PSU in which each respondent lives. In particular, we use data
on each respondent’s self-identified religion to calculate an index of religious fractional-
ization.8 This variable measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals
in a given community belong to different religious groups. The formula for the religious
fractionalization of locality l is:
Diversityl = 1 −
8∑
r=1
s2rl (1)
where srl is the proportion of respondents within locality l that belong to the religious
group r. The eight religious groups in our dataset are: Atheistic/Agnostic/None; Buddhist;
Jewish; Orthodox Christian; Catholic; Other Christian including Protestant; Muslim; and
Other.
We control for a respondent’s gender, age, risk-taking attitude and urban residence
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011). Our regressions also account for a respondent’s educational
attainment, since this may be positively associated with entrepreneurship (Ardagna and
Lusardi). As Audretsch et al. 2007 argue, religion influences the decision to become an
entrepreneur, so we control for an individual’s religion, and thus also make sure that the
effect of religious fractionalization comes from diversity itself and not from the specific
religion to which an individual belongs.
Research has argued that respondents who have more access to capital, income and
connections will be more likely to both try to start a business and succeed in setting it
up, so we control for all three factors. The survey provides information on whether the
entrepreneur tried to borrow and was successful or unsuccessful in doing so when trying
to found the business (with the omitted category those respondents that did not try to
borrow), which we include in the regressions. Instead of controlling directly for individual
income and exposure to social networks, we capture both of these variables by including
each respondent’s father’s education level and whether the respondent or any member of
his family were members of the former communist party in the spirit of Djankov et al.
2005, 2006. We do this for two reasons. Not only are households reluctant to respond
to direct questions about income or wealth, but there may also be reverse causality from
past entrepreneurial experiences (which are part of our dependent variables) to current
income levels. Moreover, former communist party membership accounts for the fact that
in the initial phase of transition nomenclature networks were used for bridging lacking
market structures (Estrin et al. 2006). We also control for a respondent’s risk attitude,
though this variable may be affected by past entrepreneurial attempts.
At the locality level, we calculate our control variables by aggregating individual
responses to several survey questions at the PSU level. For community wealth, we aggre-
gate each respondent’s perceived place on a ten-step income ladder. To measure the
quality of informal institutions, we use a respondent’s score of trust in other people. To
measure the degree of local corruption, we use information on the number of respon-
dents who believe that people like them have to make unofficial payments or gifts when
requesting official documents or when going to courts for a civil matter. Previous work
has explored extensively the link between these three variables and entrepreneurship
(Aidis et al. 2008; George et al. 2012). We are well aware that these variables may be
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endogenous to individual entrepreneurial behavior and that their effects can only be
interpreted as correlations.
Geographic characteristics which enable easy transportation access, such as low alti-
tude or being located close to a river or sea, may encourage both the formation of diverse
societies and entrepreneurship (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). We therefore
include the altitude, latitude and longitude of a locality, as well as the distance of each
PSU to the country’s border, to the capital and a dummy if the locality has access to a
waterway. In addition, we capture the importance of natural resources by also including
the distance of each PSU to the nearest mine. We also control for the adult population of
each PSU, since larger PSUs may be more diverse.
Econometric specification
To study the relationship between entrepreneurship and religious diversity, we estimate a
separate probit regression for each stage of entrepreneurship:
Pr (Trialilk = 1|Xilk ,Ylk)
=  (δ0 + Diversitylk β + Xilkδ1 + Ylkδ2 + λk + ilk
) (2)
Pr
(
Startupilk = 1|X∗ilk ,Ylk ,Trialilk = 1
)
=  (γ0 + Diversitylk ξ + X∗ilkγ1 + Ylkγ2 + λk + ηilk
) (3)
where Trialilk and Startupilk are binary variables equal to unity if individual i from locality
l and country k ever tried to set up a business, and succeeded at setting it up, respectively.
(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. The coefficients
of interest are β and ξ , which measure the correlation between the first two stages
of entrepreneurship and the religious diversity of the community, Diversitylk . The two
regression equations also contain a vector of individual controls Xilk for trial and X∗ilk for
startup, the latter containing all elements of Xilk plus the two extra variables measuring
access to finance. Included is also a vector of locality controls Ylk as well as country fixed
effects, λk , which eliminate the effect of fixed or slowly changing country-level variables
that could confound the results. Since the responses of individuals within a country will
likely be correlated, we also cluster the errors, ilk and ηilk , at the country level. All regres-
sions also include sample weights which ensure that the data are representative at the
country level.
Identification in our regression specification is based on the strong assumption that
there are no unobservable factors that would correlate with both individual entrepreneur-
ship and locality diversity. Our inclusion of country fixed effects and a battery of
observable individual and locality controls is therefore crucial. However, as discussed
above, some of our control variables are endogenous. In addition, there is the possibility
of selection bias as some of our control variables also have missing observations. What is
more, it is unlikely that controlling for observables will completely eliminate the problem
of omitted variable bias.
Therefore, we also adopt a second strategy. We apply the insight of Altonji et al. 2005
that selection on observables can be used to calculate the potential bias from unobserv-
ables and compute the ratio developed by Bellows and Miguel 2009. The ratio is β
F
βR−βF ,
where βF is the coefficient for diversity in the regression with the full set of controls
and βR is the coefficient for diversity in the regression without any controls. Bellows and
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Miguel 2009 show that this is a consistent measure for how many times higher selection
on unobservables must be than selection on observables to completely explain away the
effect of diversity.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents means of all variables used in the main estimations and highlights sev-
eral interesting patterns. Columns 1 and 2 include the entire sample of respondents, while
columns 3 and 4 limit the sample to only those respondents who tried to set up a business.
On average 14% of respondents try to start a new venture, and 63% of those that tried
manage to start it up. An average locality is moderately diverse with a religious fraction-
alization score of 0.19 (trial) and 0.22 (startup). Around one quarter of respondents are
Muslim, while over 60% are Christian (either Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant). Those
who have started a business are more likely to be male, and are more risk-loving. The vast
majority of respondents have finished their secondary education, but only around 20%
have a university degree (with a higher value, 28% for those respondents who have tried to
setup a business). A respondent’s father has on average 9-10 years of education. In nearly
Table 1Means of variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire sample Sub-sample of those that tried
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Trial 0.14 (0.35) 1.00 (0.00)
Startup – – 0.63 (0.48)
Diversity 0.19 (0.21) 0.22 (0.22)
Male 0.40 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50)
Age 43.88 (16.76) 42.49 (13.31)
Muslim 0.27 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42)
Christian 0.63 (0.48 ) 0.62 (0.48)
Risk Score 4.77 (2.62) 5.95 (2.72)
Secondary Education 0.68 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47)
Bachelor/Master’s Education 0.21 (0.41) 0.28 (0.45)
Father’s Education 9.32 (4.10) 9.91 (3.98)
Member Communist Party 0.24 (0.43) 0.30 (0.46)
Urban 0.59 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49)
Loan Accepted – – 0.27 (0.45)
Loam Rejected – – 0.09 (0.29)
Locality Average Wealth 4.33 (0.95) 4.27 (0.89)
Locality Average Trust 3.12 (0.68) 3.08 (0.67)
Locality Average Corruption 1.82 (0.78) 1.85 (0.76)
Locality Population 84,290.09 (307,594.98) 85,750.97 (323,595.66)
Locality Latitude 45.76 (4.90) 45.70 (4.65)
Locality Longitude 34.59 (22.60) 36.55 (26.48)
Locality Altitude 378.38 (419.56) 398.46 (442.70)
Locality Distance to Mine 64.79 (71.53) 60.86 (67.16)
Locality Distance to Capital 134.36 (266.73) 144.99 (323.82)
Locality Distance to Border 34.52 (52.63) 36.14 (53.39)
Locality on Water 0.41 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49)
Observations 21,725 3,046
Notes. See the text and the Additional file 1 for definitions of all variables.
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one third of the cases, somebody in the respondent’s family or the respondent herself was
a former communist party member. The rest of the individual and PSU-level variables are
fairly similar across both samples.
Results
In Tables 2 and 3 we present regressions investigating the association between diversity
and entrepreneurial trial and startup. For each dependent variable, we present probit aver-
age marginal effects, which are closely comparable to the point estimates from a linear
probability model.9 We experiment with the number and types of controls that we include
in columns 1-2, and present the full specification in column 3. Our average marginal
Table 2 Probit regressions: entrepreneurial trial
(1) (2) (3)
margins_b/margins_se margins_b/margins_se margins_b/margins_se
Diversity 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Age2 – –
Muslim -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Christian 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Risk Score 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00)
Secondary Education 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
College Education 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02)
Father’s Education 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Member Communist Party 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Urban -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Locality Avg. Wealth -0.01***
(0.01)
Locality Avg. Trust -0.01***
(0.00)
Locality Avg. Corruption 0.00
(0.01)
Geography Controls 
Country F.E.   
Obs. 32,302 22,779 21,725
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.11 0.11
Notes. The table presents average marginal effects obtained from probit regressions. The dependent variable is whether the
individual ever tried to set up a business. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. The
Geography Controls not listed in the table are: Locality Population, Locality Latitude, Locality Longitude, Locality Altitude,
Locality Distance to Mine, Locality Distance to Capital, Locality Distance to Border, Locality on Water.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Checkmarks indicate that the respective control is included in the regressions.
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Table 3 Probit regressions: entrepreneurial startup
(1) (2) (3)
margins_b/margins_se margins_b/margins_se margins_b/margins_se
Diversity 0.11** 0.05 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Male -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age2 – –
Muslim -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Christian 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Risk Score 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
Secondary Education 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
College Education 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.05)
Father’s Education 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Member Communist Party -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Urban -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Loan Accepted 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02)
Loan Rejected -0.34*** -0.33***
(0.04) (0.04)
Locality Avg. Wealth 0.01
(0.01)
Locality Avg. Trust 0.01
(0.02)
Locality Avg. Corruption -0.01
(0.02)
Geography Controls 
Country F.E.   
Obs. 4,106 3,172 3,046
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.16
Notes. The table presents average marginal effects obtained from probit regressions. The dependent variable is whether the
individual ever set up a business (conditional on trial). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country
level. The Geography Controls not listed in the table are: Locality Population, Locality Latitude, Locality Longitude, Locality
Altitude, Locality Distance to Mine, Locality Distance to Capital, Locality Distance to Border, Locality on Water.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. Checkmarks indicate that the respective control is included in the regressions.
effect estimates in column 3 of Table 2 suggest that, on average, religious fractionaliza-
tion increases the probability of entrepreneurial trial by 0.05, or 35% relative to the sample
mean, which is a fairly large effect.
Turning to Table 3, we see that religious diversity is positively and significantly associ-
ated with entrepreneurial startup in column 1, when no individual or PSU-level controls
are included. This effect stays positive but becomes very imprecise once the additional
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controls are added. In particular, once access to finance (proxied by the two variables indi-
cating whether the respondent was successfully (unsuccessfully) able to obtain a formal
or informal loan for the business, with the omitted category those respondents who did
not try to borrow) and risk preferences are included, the significance of the diversity coef-
ficient disappears. This suggests that the effect of religious diversity on entrepreneurial
startup may be overshadowed by these factors. We therefore conclude that Hypothe-
sis 2 is only partially validated. Increased religious diversity is only positively associated
with the very first stage of entrepreneurship, trial, but not with the subsequent one,
startup.
The control variables show several interesting patterns and point to the importance
of different criteria at the two stages of entrepreneurship as in Hypothesis 1. While
on average women are approximately 6 percentage points less likely to try to become
entrepreneurs, they are no less successful than men in the startup stage. Age has
an inverted U-shaped relationship with entrepreneurial trial, but no relationship with
startup. More risk loving individuals are about 2 percentage points more likely to both
try to become entrepreneurs and to start up a business, though of course this could be
driven by reverse causality from entrepreneurship. More education is positively associ-
ated only with entrepreneurial trial, but not with startup. Similarly, individuals that are
wealthier and better connected (as proxied by the respondent’s father’s education and
family membership in the former communist party) are more likely to try to start a busi-
ness, but no more likely to succeed in the startup phase. Access to finance is the strongest
correlate of entrepreneurial start-up: individuals who tried to borrow but could not are
nearly a third more likely to fail compared to those who did not try to borrow, while
entrepreneurs who borrowed successfully are 14 percentage points more likely to start a
business.
When it comes to local-level controls, individuals in PSUs that are wealthier and
with better informal institutions are less likely to try to start a business, but the effect
is minor. It could be that in these locations respondents have other more profitable
sources of employment. Neither of these two variables is significant in the startup
equation, and the quality of local institutions - captured through the extent of cor-
ruption at the PSU level - is irrelevant for both potential and nascent entrepreneurs.
None of the included PSU variables affect entrepreneurial startup, possibly because
they are overshadowed by access to finance. Again, the PSU controls are likely to
be endogenous to entrepreneurial behavior, so their coefficients should be interpreted
with caution. All in all, we also find support for Hypothesis 1, which posited that
entrepreneurial trial and startup are affected differently by individual and environmental
factors.
The main findings of Tables 2 and 3 are that diversity is positively associated with
entrepreneurial trial, but that its effect on entrepreneurial startup is overshadowed by
access to finance and risk attitudes. We now turn to calculate the ratio of Bellows and
Miguel 2009 to estimate the impact of unobservables for the trial regressions. For βR we
use the coefficient from Table 2, Row 1, Column 1 and for βF the coefficient from Table 2,
Row 1, Column 3. We obtain that selection on unobservables needs to be more than dou-
ble (2.16) as high as selection on observables to explain away our results. Such a scenario
is unlikely to happen (Altonji et al. 2008), suggesting that even in the light of remaining
omitted variable bias, our results still stand.
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Interaction effects
To understand how social capital moderates the association between diversity and
entrepreneurial trial and startup, we include three interaction terms. Due to the com-
plexity of interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models, we implement a linear
probability model (to which our earlier results are also robust). We measure social cap-
ital in three inter-related ways. The first variable we use is Friends which is equal to
1 if the respondent meets frequently (more than once a month) with his friends. We
expect this variable to be a proxy of how densely connected the social group of the
respondent is. The second variable we examine is Weak Ties, a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent knows someone, other than relatives, friends, classmates or boss,
who he can ask for help. This is a measure of access to non-familial, or weak ties.
Our final proxy is Internal, a dummy equal to unity if the respondent believes that the
factors most important to succeeding in his country are effort and hard work, or intelli-
gence and skills.10 We use this variable as a proxy for internal locus of control, which is
defined as the belief that one’s life is not determined by external factors that they can-
not influence. Previous studies have found that people who believe to be in control of
the events in their lives, a personality feature that tends to be relatively stable through-
out life, are more likely to bridge structural holes (Kalish and Robins 2006). Note that
all three of these variable capture a respondent’s overall social capital, rather than net-
works within or across religious groups, about which the LiTS does not provide any
information.
Table 4 reports the results of linear probability models examining the correlations
between the interactions of social capital and diversity and entrepreneurial trial and
startup. The coefficients on the controls remain largely the same, and to conserve space
we omit them from the table. Hypothesis 3 suggests that all three measures of social cap-
ital will interact with diversity to positively affect entrepreneurship, but the results in
columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 contradict it. Social capital, when proxied by network den-
sity, in fact negativelymoderates the association between diversity and entrepreneurship.
The coefficient of the interaction term between Diversity and Friends is significant at the
5% level for Trial and at the 10% level for Startup and has in both cases a negative sign.
Respondents who meet frequently with friends and live in diverse locations are in fact 6
percentage points less likely to try to start a business and nearly 12 percentage points less
likely to actually start it up. The stand-alone coefficient on the variable proxying meeting
frequently with friends is, however, not significant. These results suggests that respon-
dents who are not embedded in a dense network can draw more benefits from diversity
in their entrepreneurial attempts.
The results of columns 3 and 4 partially confirm Hypothesis 3. Social capital, this time
understood as access to weak ties, does positively moderate the association between
diversity and entrepreneurship, but only for trial. The coefficient of the interaction term
between Diversity and Weak Ties is significant at the 1% level for Trial, but insignificant
for Startup. Respondents who can access weak ties in times of need seem to be bet-
ter equipped to harness the benefits of diversity so as to have a probability of nearly 31
percentage points higher of trying to set up a business. Unfortunately, access to weak
ties does not translate to a higher probability of actually starting the business in more
diverse localities. Moreover, the coefficient ofWeak Ties is insignificant for both Trial and
Startup.
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Table 4 OLS regressions: interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trial Startup Trial Startup Trial Startup
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Diversity 0.105*** 0.156* 0.0527* 0.0551 0.0108 0.0392
(2.84) (1.80) (2.03) (0.88) (0.37) (0.49)
Friends 0.0154 0.0153
(1.60) (0.51)
Friends X Diversity -0.0610** -0.118*
(-2.13) (-1.83)
Weak Ties -0.0181 -0.0727
(-0.78) (-0.46)
Weak Ties X Diversity 0.308*** 0.301
(3.21) (0.99)
Internal -0.0168* 0.0140
(-2.03) (0.44)
Internal X Diversity 0.0580** 0.0170
(2.35) (0.21)
Individual Controls      
Locality Controls      
Country Fixed Effects      
Obs. 21,725 3,046 21,725 3,046 20,615 2,921
Pseudo R2
Notes. The table presents coefficients obtained from OLS regressions. The dependent variables are whether the individual
ever tried to set up a business and whether he managed to set it up (conditional on trial). Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the country level. The Individual Controls and Locality Controls not listed in the table are all of the
control variables included in Tables 2 and 3. Checkmarks indicate that the respective control is included in the regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Columns 5 and 6 also partially confirm Hypothesis 3. Social capital, understood as
the ability to bridge structural holes, does positively moderate the association between
diversity and entrepreneurship, but only for trial. The coefficient of the interaction term
between Diversity and Internal is significant at the 5% level for Trial, but insignificant for
Startup. Respondents with a strong internal locus of control may be better equipped to
bridge the structural holes that emerge in a diverse community and thereforemay bemore
willing to try to set up businesses in diverse communities. However, those with internal
locus of control in general try less to set up a new business, as the negative coefficient
of Internal indicates. It may be that they value other employment opportunities more as
compared to entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 3 is therefore confirmed only when social capital is understood as the
opportunity to bridge structural holes and access to weak ties, but not as network density.
Robustness checks
Measures of diversity
Averaging our main explanatory variable at the PSU level, when the survey is not rep-
resentative at this level, is not ideal. However, as discussed in the introduction, there is
no other sub-national data on religious diversity for our sample. Moreover, as explained
earlier, our measure of religious diversity correlates well with country-level measures of
religious fractionalization. In Table 5, we address this concern further by creating, for each
PSU, a dummy variable equal to unity if the fractionalization index is higher than 30%. As
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Table 5 Probit regressions: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trial Startup Trial Startup Trial Startup Trial Startup
Diversity dummy Regional diversity After 2005 Moving
Diversity 0.02* 0.03 0.10** -0.09 0.04** 0.08 0.05** 0.06
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.06)
Male 0.06*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.01 0.03*** 0.03 0.06*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age2 – – – – – – –
Muslim -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Christian 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
Risk Score 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Secondary Education 0.06*** 0.04 0.06*** 0.04 0.03*** 0.07 0.06*** 0.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
College Education 0.09*** 0.07 0.09*** 0.06 0.05*** 0.09* 0.09*** 0.06
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Father’s Education 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Member Communist 0.03*** -0.02 0.03*** -0.02 0.01*** -0.05** 0.03*** -0.02
Party (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Urban 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
No Move -0.02*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Loan Accepted 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Loan Rejected -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.38*** -0.33***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Locality Controls        
Country Fixed Effects        
Obs. 21,725 3,046 21,725 3,046 20,079 1,401 21,634 3,042
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.16
Notes. The table presents average marginal effects obtained from probit regressions. The dependent variables are whether
the individual ever tried to set up a business and whether he managed to set it up (conditional on trial). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses clustered at the country level. In Columns 1 and 2 Diversity is calculated as a dummy variable equal
to 1 if local religious fractionalization is higher than 0.3. In Columns 3 and 4 Diversity is calculated as regional religious
fractionalization. In Columns 5 - 8 Diversity is calculated as local religious fractionalization. Columns 5-6 limit the sample to
those who tried to start a business only after 2005, while columns 7-8 control for whether the individual has ever moved.
The Locality Controls not listed in the table are all of the locality (PSU) control variables included in Tables 2 and 3.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Checkmarks indicate that the respective control is included in the regressions.
can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of the table, religious diversity is still positively associated
with Trial at the 10% significance level and still not associated with Startup, which is sim-
ilar to our earlier results. Another worry is that each PSU contains about 20 households
and that this introduces small sample bias in the measure.We therefore calculate diversity
as a fractionalization index also at the sub-national regional level, where there are on aver-
age 138 households per region. In Column 3 and 4 of Table 5, it can be seen that the main
results remain confirmed and are actually stronger for the trial regressions. In unreported
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specifications, we also experimented with using language rather than religious fraction-
alization as a measure of diversity. We also ran specifications in which religious diversity
is measured by religious polarization, which is maximized when there are two groups of
equal size.11 The literature has argued that cultural polarization is more relevant for out-
comes such as civil war (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). In both cases, we obtain
very similar results to our baseline specification.
Endogeneity
Although diversity is likely to change more slowly than entrepreneurship, it is possible
that our results capture reverse causality to some extent. As the number of entrepreneurs
in an area grows, exchange linkages become more complex, and cultural heterogeneity
is more easily tolerated, which in turn may increase migration and diversity. Since such
a mechanism works over the long term, we experimented with limiting the sample only
to respondents that tried to start a business recently (after 2005) or not at all, and the
results, available in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, are unchanged.We also show that there is
no evidence that nascent entrepreneurs choose to move to more diverse areas, relative to
non-entrepreneurs. In Columns 7 and 8, we control for whether the respondent has ever
moved, which has little effect on the results.
Selection bias
Since entrepreneurial startup is conditional on trial, an independent estimation of the
startup equation could suffer from selection bias. In order to account for this we
run a Heckman sample selection model. Due to the difficulty in finding a variable
that affects trial, but not startup, these results should be interpreted as suggestive
only. We argue that the following individual-level variable can function as an exclu-
sion restriction: a dummy for whether the respondent’s preferred type of employment
is self-employment, but with the caveat that it may be endogenous to entrepreneurial
startup. We assume that a respondent’s preference for entrepreneurship influences only
his trial stage, but not his startup stage. The results from the Heckprobit estimates of
entrepreneurial startup (available upon request) are very similar to our baseline spec-
ification. The selection coefficient (or the inverse Mill’s ratio) is significant, indicating
that there is selection bias in the simple probit estimations. Nevertheless, the results are
largely consistent with those in Table 3, although some parameters are more precisely
estimated.
We also perform the following additional robustness checks, for which results avail-
able upon request. Our results survive when we aggregate all dependent and independent
variables at the PSU level and when we cluster the standard errors by PSU to account for
possible correlation between the individual and PSU-level variables.
Conclusions and policy implications
Using a new and rich survey data set (the 2010 round of the Life in Transition Survey),
this paper seeks to understand if local religious diversity helps or hinders entrepreneurs
in the transition region. Contrary to a large literature that finds a negative impact of
diversity on firm-level and country-level outcomes, we do not find any evidence that reli-
gious diversity stifles entrepreneurial trial or start-up. But does local religious diversity
help business owners? Our results suggest that the answer here is more nuanced: yes, but
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not in all stages of entrepreneurship. While local religious diversity has a positive impact
on business trial, it has a weak effect in the subsequent business start-up phase which
is overshadowed by an individual’s access to finance and risk attitudes. What is more,
the potential entrepreneurs who are best positioned to benefit from local religious diver-
sity are those that have social capital in the sense of capacity to bridge over structural
holes and access weak ties, but not necessarily those that belong to dense social networks.
Understanding the drivers of both phases of entrepreneurship is highly policy-relevant, as
many individuals who embark on the process of starting a business never reach the point
of actually founding it.
The finding that religious diversity helps in the trial phase of entrepreneurship, but
not in actually starting up the new venture is puzzling. A possible explanation is that
the transition region contains mostly Kirznerian entrepreneurs who are dependent on
their environment for generating business opportunities. These opportunities may arise
because religious diversity spurs creative ideas or provides access to new information.
But it could also be that some of diversity’s negative consequences, such as labor dis-
crimination, distrust, or underprovision of public goods, provide niche markets for
business starters. For example, retail entrepreneurs may be able to play a bridging role
in divided localities, while underprovided public goods may be equally well provided
privately.
Whatever the source of these extra opportunities, they do not seem to translate to more
start-ups in diverse communities. Instead, our results point to the importance of access to
(formal as well as informal) finance and risk attitudes. On the one hand, it could be that
entrepreneurs in more diverse places are more likely to get financing, either because such
business starters have better ideas or a better supply of opportunities. On the other hand,
entrepreneurs in diverse environments may require more financing because the fixed or
variable costs of operating a business there may be higher. It could also be that locali-
ties with higher availability of financing also attract more diverse populations, although
several of our robustness checks suggested that this channel is less likely to be at work.
Alternatively, living in a diverse area may change respondents’ behavior and attitudes,
including those toward risk taking, although disentangling such an effect is difficult due
to reverse causality from entrepreneurship.
Even though our data preclude us from pinpointing the exact mechanism at work,
the finding that credit constraints are more important than local religious diversity for
entrepreneurial startup has several important implications. First, it is surprising that
access to finance has such a strong effect for the small (and often informal) businesses
captured in the LiTS, which goes beyond the impact of other proxies of personal wealth,
such as education or parental background. These results echo cross-country work on
larger firms which shows that underdeveloped capital markets are an impediment to
entrepreneurial activity in the transition region, but not in the more mature European
economies (Desai et al. 2003). Second, external financing could have stronger disciplin-
ing benefits on the entrepreneur as opposed to personal wealth or remittances (see,
for instance, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011). What is more, it is also plausible that the
effects of access to finance vary with the religious diversity of the entrepreneur’s local-
ity, either because commitment may be easier or more difficult to enforce in more
diverse places, or because diverse regions are more likely to produce as well as fund
viable entrepreneurial opportunities. However, this is less likely to be the case, as in
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unreported results, we fail to find an interaction effect between access to finance and
diversity.
What are the broader policy recommendations that emerge from our paper? Govern-
ments and international organizations acknowledge that fostering entrepreneurship is
crucial for creating a dynamic market economy. We find that there are slow-changing
variables (such as religious diversity) that may be less susceptible to policy interventions
but that should still be taken into account when designing entrepreneurial policies and
choosing which regions to support. But we also uncover several potentially useful pol-
icy levers, which may in fact differ at various entrepreneurial stages. Non-familial social
ties and the belief that one’s abilities are most important for success in life, which we
found to be particularly important for entrepreneurial trial in diverse localities, could
be nurtured via training and networking programs, for instance. Since we also demon-
strate that more educated respondents are more likely to try entrepreneurial activities,
a case could be made for more and better education, possibly focused on skills relevant
for entrepreneurs. One concrete suggestion could be to encourage interaction between
entrepreneurs and experienced managers in the developed world, which may be partic-
ularly beneficial for enterprises located in diverse environments. One such example is
the EBRD’s Small Business Support Program, which matches Western executives to pri-
vate enterprises in the transition region in order to facilitate the sharing of technical and
management knowledge.
At the same time, expanding the availability of credit appears to be the key factor
in increasing the number of business startups and should also rank high on the pol-
icy agenda. Such a recommendation poses both opportunities and challenges. A new
generation of banks exclusively focused on funding for micro and small enterprises,
such as ProCredit Bank, which operates throughout the transition region, could be one
potential solution. In addition, an entrepreneur-friendly legal framework may also be
important. For example, creating high-quality business registries or easing the collateral
requirements for new business loans may be useful. However, formal financing is less
likely to benefit small informal businesses, and perhaps alternative financial strategies -
such as traditional microfinance schemes - may need to be pursued. For instance, the
Bosnian microfinance organization EKI provides credit to small businesses in the rural
and agricultural sector, where informality may be particularly high.
Finally, we hope to have shown that governments should pay increasing attention to
nurturing the Kirznerian entrepreneur, and even more so in diverse localities. Although
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are likely to drive economic transformation in transition,
small-scale entrepreneurship may not only provide a valuable income buffer for house-
holds, but can also aide the transition to larger, formal businesses. Ever prevalent, but
often neglected, the Kirznerian entrepreneur epitomizes the difficult but promising eco-
nomic transition which many countries in a region scarred by nearly fifty years of
communism are still undergoing.
Endnotes
1A literature looking at US communities finds that an ethnically diverse population is
associated with less efficient provision of public goods, less trust and less economic
growth (Alesina et al. 1999; Luttmer 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Ottaviano and
Peri 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Furthermore, Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011
calculate diversity and segregation measures for a large number of countries using
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census data at the level of country administrative regions (which are more aggregated
than the PSU analysis we use). However, none of these papers provide sub-national
diversity measures for the entire transition region (the latter paper only covers 14
transition countries).
2See also Laitin and Jeon 2013 for a broader review of this literature.
3The empirical findings in the management literature are inconclusive. At the
team-level, Joshi and Roh 2009 report that more than half of the studies reviewed do not
find a relationship between team outcomes and team diversity, while the rest find either
positive or negative effects.
4Granovetter 1973 makes a similar argument which distinguishes between strong and
weak ties.
5These are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, FYRMacedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kosovo and Montenegro.
The survey also includes for comparison purposes five Western European countries
(France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom) and Turkey. We exclude these
countries from our sample because they did not experience a period of communism and
therefore do not belong to the transition region, which is the focus of our study.
6The other modules are: Attitudes and Values; Climate Change; Labor, Education and
Entrepreneurial Activity; Governance, and Miscellaneous Questions.
7Note also that the trial question refers to having ever tried to set up a business. Thus
the ventures could have been set up anytime between 1989 and 2010 (in fact, the survey
asks for the year in which the respondent last tried to start a business). Our definition of
entrepreneurship thus needs to fit throughout this entire period of extreme change.
8See Section Robustness checks for a discussion of the potential pitfalls of this
measure and robustness checks.
9We do not present coefficient estimates for Age squared due to the difficulty of
interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models.
10When Internal is equal to 0, the respondent believes that most important for success
in his country are either political connections, breaking the law of something else.
11The formula for religious polarization for the eight religious groups in our data
(described above) is:
Diversityl = 4
8∑
r=1
[ srl]2 [ 1 − srl] ,
where srl is the proportion of respondents within locality l that belong to each religious
group r.
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